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DEFERRED CASH PAYMENTS TO SECURED
CREDITORS IN CRAM DOWN OF CHAPTER
11 PLANS: A MATTER OF INTEREST
What is the present value of deferred payments made to secured
creditors under a Chapter 11 reorganization plan? Courts agree that
the present value depends on the interest rate that is used to compute
the payments' value.2 They cannot agree, however, on how the proper
interest rate should be determined.'
In their attempts to set a proper interest rate, most courts travel
down the dead-end road of market rate analysis. Bogged down in the
intricacies of this analysis, courts frequently ignore their fundamental
role in bankruptcy proceedings: Resolving the tension between giving
creditors protection while giving debtors a chance to save their busi-
nesses. Examinations of economic data and theories preoccupy the
courts as well as creditors and debtors. This effort to determine the
proper interest rate takes place in a vacuum, cut off from considera-
tions of creditors' and debtors' rights and the bankruptcy system's
purposes.
The method used by courts for setting interest rates in business reor-
ganization cases should be reevaluated. Instead of case-by-case deter-
minations, courts could use, in all cases, Treasury securities yields of
an appropriate maturity. With these relatively low interest rates, more
reorganizations will be feasible. Low rates will also increase the
chance of preserving the economic viability of the debtor and insure
continuing employment. In addition, treasury rates are accessible,
making expensive litigation unnecessary and saving the debtor's assets
for distribution among creditors. Loan markets can adapt to the stan-
dard. Finally, creditors can protect themselves from the risk of loss
from Chapter 11 proceedings by slightly raising contract interest rates.
A single, clear standard for interest rate determination will decrease
the tension between creditors' and debtors' interests in the bankruptcy
process.
I. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE INTEREST RATE LEVEL
Interest required on deferred payments can determine the success or
failure of the debtor's reorganization plan. Not surprisingly, the issue
1. I U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. In re Southern States Motor Inns, 709 F.2d 647, 650 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1022 (1984).
3. Id. at 651.
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is hotly contested between debtors and secured creditors. Courts are
often asked to resolve the dispute. In setting an interest rate, courts
not only resolve a particular dispute about the proper interest rate.
They also define the purposes of the bankruptcy system, the rights of
debtors and creditors in Chapter 11, and their respective bargaining
power in Chapter 11 reorganization plan negotiations.
A. Chapter 11 Cram Down and Deferred Payments
A Chapter 11 reorganization plan restructures the debtor's obliga-
tions, usually to decrease immediate cash flow problems4 by extending
the time period for payment. In general, a court must deny confirma-
tion of the plan if any affected class of creditors rejects the plan.' If a
class rejects a plan, however, the debtor can request confirmation
under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 6 If the plan complies with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) and eleven other requirements, 7 the court must confirm the
reorganization plan.
To achieve confirmation despite rejection by a class of secured credi-
tors, the plan must be "fair and equitable" and not "discriminate
unfairly" among holders of similar claims.' A plan can be fair and
equitable if it meets one of three alternative minimum requirements. 9
The first requirement mandates that the creditor retain the lien secur-
4. See Klee, All You Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy
Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979), reprinted in 1981 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 201, 201 (1981)
(all subsequent references are to the page number in the reprinted version of the article).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A class of creditors fails to accept the plan
if one-half or more of the creditors holding more than one-third in amount of claims reject it. 11
U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982). If collateral secures the claim, it is unique and usually in a class by
itself. A single secured creditor therefore can "veto" the proposed plan.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The process of plan confirmation despite
rejection by a class of creditors is called "cram down." See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 413 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6369.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Both the plan and the proponent of the plan
have to comply with the provisions of Chapter 11 and the plan must be proposed in good faith.
§ 1129(a)(l)-(3). Payments in connection with the case must be subject to court approval and
certain appointments and treatment of insiders must be disclosed. § 1129(a)(4), (5). Any
government regulatory commission with jurisdiction over the debtor's rates must have approved
rate changes. § 1129(a)(6). A dissenting member of a class that has accepted the plan must
receive at least what Chapter 7 liquidation would have provided. § 1129(a)(7). Certain priority
claims have to be paid on the effective date of the plan and tax claims have to be paid over a
period not exceeding six years. § 1129(a)(9). At least one impaired class must accept the plan.
§ 1129(a)(10). The plan must be feasible. § 1129(a)(I 1). All fees payable under § 1930 of title
28 will be paid on the effective date of the plan. § 1129(a)(12).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982). The requirement that the plan not unfairly discriminate
among holders of similar claims is usually met with respect to a class of secured creditors because
they do not hold similar claims.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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ing its claim and receive deferred cash payments with a present value
that is equal to the secured claim's value. 10 The analysis of this Com-
ment focuses on that method of meeting the fair and equitable test of
Chapter 11 cram down.
B. The Courts' Role in the Dispute Between Debtor and Creditor
Courts, debtors, and creditors agree that the "fair and equitable"
test requires that some interest be paid on deferred cash payments. 1'
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Code") 2 explicitly refers to interest.' 3 The legislative history is
silent, however, on the method of determining the appropriate interest
rate. Debtor and creditor, unable to agree on the interest rate, bring
this question to the court for resolution.
When a court is asked to apply the cram down provisions to a
secured creditor, it is dealing with an unusual Chapter 11 proceed-
ing.14 The Code was designed to facilitate efficient, fair outcomes with
minimal court involvement by balancing the bargaining power of
debtor and creditor.' 5 In this situation, however, debtor and creditor
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(1), (I1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This section provides that
the creditor has to receive deferred cash payments "totaling at least the allowed amount of [its]
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest
in the estate's interest in such property." § l129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll).
The test is also met if the secured creditor realizes the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). The language refers to the approach taken in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5913. This section is invoked only if the creditor is to
receive property rather than cash. Courts then require that the present value of the property be
equal to the value of the claim. This test usually does not focus primarily on the interest rate
question. The third alternative permits sale of the collateral as long as the creditor's lien attaches
to the proceeds. The creditor then has to receive either deferred cash payments with a present
value equal to the allowed claim or the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim. 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). Under most plans, sale of collateral is not propbsed.
11. See, eg., In re Smith, 58 Bankr. 652, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985); In re Connecticut
Aerosols, 42 Bankr. 706, 707 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
13. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 414-15:
Application of the test ... requires a valuation of the consideration "as of the effective
date of the plan". This contemplates a present value analysis that will discount value to be
received in the future; of course, if the interest paid is equivalent to the discount rate used,
the present value and face future value will be identical. ... [I]f no interest is proposed to
be paid, the present value will be less than the face future value.
14. See Klee, supra note 4, at 201 (debtor and creditors reached an agreement in majority of
cases in which plans are confirmed).
15. See, eg., COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, pt.I at 253-54,
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Appendix 2 (L.
1043
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were unable to reach the negotiated settlement envisioned by the draft-
ers of the Code.
t6
Given the incentive to settle,' 7 failure to do so indicates that the
parties' dispute involves more than simply setting an interest rate. 18
By setting the interest rate, the court not only decides the interest rate
issue, but it vindicates or compromises the positions taken by the par-
ties about their respective rights as debtor and creditor. The court's
decision also affects the Code's goal of encouraging negotiated
settlements. 19
Courts requiring a high interest rate treat creditor protection as
cram down's major purpose. A higher interest rate gives secured cred-
itors greater compensation for the losses and risks associated with the
delayed payment of their claims. Higher rates force more conversions
to Chapter 7 liquidation,20 allowing secured creditors to take posses-
sion of their collateral or of the proceeds of its sale. The threat of
higher rates required in cram down increases the secured creditor's
bargaining power during negotiations over the reorganization plan.
Courts requiring a low interest rate promote the general purpose of
permitting debtors to reorganize. The lower interest payments
decrease the burden on the debtor. More plans will be feasible,
increasing the chance that businesses and jobs will be preserved. If
King 15th ed. 1979). The Commission criticized the fairness standard of the prior law because
old Chapter XI favored the debtor too much and Chapter X hampered negotiations by requiring
independent court inquiry into the plan's fairness. Id.
16. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative,
39 Bus. LAW. 441, 441 (1984) (Chapter 11 is biased toward settlement).
17. Cram down litigation prolongs the proceedings, is expensive, and removes the
determination of the parties' rights from their control. Cf Axe, Penetrating the Iron Curtain:
Representing Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Reorganization Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REV.
421, 424 (1984) (debtors elect to forego the uncertainties of cram down); Broude, supra note 16,
at 441 (possible negative impact of cram down so significant that it represents a threat rather
than a "club actually employed").
18. Disputes often involve one or more of the following positions. The creditor is resisting the
debtor's attempts to refinance its debts at a lower rate by resorting to Chapter 1 's protection.
The creditor wants to force liquidation, and other methods, such as requesting conversion to a
Chapter 7 liquidation, filing a plan that proposes liquidation, or challenging the debtor's good
faith or the plan's feasibility, have failed. Successfully demanding a higher interest rate on
deferred payments may achieve the goal if the debtor cannot pay the higher rate. The creditor
wants more of the debtor's future income by asking for a higher interest rate. Valuation of the
creditor's claim can achieve the same result and may have been decided against the creditor in a
separate court ruling. The debtor then resists the creditor's efforts to obtain through the interest
rate what was denied by a low valuation of the claim.
19. Klee, supra note 4, at 201-02 (cram down rules affect negotiating posture of debtor and
creditors, requiring judges, debtor, and creditors to know under what conditions a plan will be
confirmed under cram down rules).
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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successful, the reorganization allows unsecured creditors and equity
holders to recover funds. Lower rates also make Chapter 11 a more
attractive alternative to the debtor that chooses not to pay its debts or
simply wants to refinance at lower rates.
Adherence to either interpretation of cram down's role in Chapter
11 is not mandated by the Code. Cram down can also be used to
balance the rights of debtor and secured creditor. The court can set
the rate according to its assessment of the requirements of fairness and
equity.
II. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE INTEREST
RATE ISSUE
Concluding that the Code and legislative history do not address the
question of the appropriate interest rate, an influential commentator
has argued for the use of market interest rates.21 Collier views the
deferred payment arrangement between creditor and debtor as a
"coerced loan." 22 According to Collier's theory, loan markets and
market interest rates determine the appropriate interest rate.23 Mar-
ket rate analysis is now prominent in cases dealing with the deferred
24payment provisions. A discussion of market interest rates provides
21. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 911129.03, at 1129-62 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
22. Id. at 1129-62 to -63:
It is submitted that deferred payment of an obligation under a plan is a coerced loan and
the rate of return with respect to such loan must correspond to the rate which would be
charged or obtained by the creditor making a loan to a third party with similar terms,
duration, collateral, and risk. It is therefore submitted that the appropriate discount rate
must be determined by reference to the "market" interest rate.
(footnote omitted).
As is indicated by this excerpt, the terms "interest" and "discount" rate are prominent in
materials related to cram down provisions. When the term "interest" as distinguished from
"discount" rate is used, an amount that is earned or added to a certain sum is usually described.
For example, at 10% interest per year, $1000 would earn $100 interest by the end of the year.
The reverse procedure is implied by the term "discount" rate. A bond with a face value of $1000
payable one year from now and selling presently for $909 has been discounted by an annual rate
of 10%. See D. PEARCE, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 110-11 (2d ed. 1983).
To apply § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), namely to determine whether the proposed payments, includ-
ing interest payments, are equal to the value of the collateral, the court must "discount" all
future payments by an interest rate it deems appropriate. The present value figure is then com-
pared with the assessed value of the collateral. The court's choice of discount rate does not
change the present value of the secured creditor's claim. The collateral's value is determined by a
separate valuation procedure. Instead, when the present value of the deferred payments is found
not to be equal to the value of the collateral, either proposed principal or interest payments have
to be changed.
23. Id Collier presents an extensive table of market rates, noting that a "range of prevailing
interest rates" exists at any point in time. Id at n.45.
24. See, eg., In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503, 1505
(9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1986); In re
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helpful background before summarizing the courts' applications of
market rate analysis.
A. Interest Rates
In economics and finance, the term "interest rate" is well defined.25
A nominal26 interest rate has three components: Inflationary expecta-
tions, a "real" rate of interest, and certain risk premiums.27 Each of
the elements takes into account a separate aspect of the difference
between having a certain amount of money now rather than later.28
One component of the nominal interest rate is an estimate of future
inflation rates. If inflation occurs while a loan is outstanding, the
amount of money lent will have a lower purchasing power when it is
repaid. Lenders want to be protected against loss of purchasing power
caused by inflation.29 Interest rates reflect the market's expectations
about future inflation rates.30
Different inflation rates may be expected for different time periods.
The "inflationary expectations" element of interest rates represents the
market's3' best estimate of future inflation rates over various time peri-
ods. Short-term rates32 include inflationary expectations closely tied
to actual inflation. Over the short term of the loan, any change in the
inflation rate is not expected to result in a significantly different aver-
Monnier Bros. 755 F.2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Southern States Motor Inns, 709 F.2d
647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
25. In economic theory, "interest" means the return earned by capital; in banking and
finance, the charge for borrowing money. C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS 235 (2d ed. 1984).
Collier advocates determining the appropriate interest rate by referring to interest rates
prevailing in the market, as opposed to rates set outside the market. Legal interest rates are an
example of non-market interest rates. The discussion in this section of the article refers to
interest rates set in the market.
26. "Nominal" describes the measurement of an economic magnitude in current prices and
denotes the opposite of "real." D. PEARCE, supra note 22, at 313; see also E. BRIGHAM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 60 n.5 (4th ed. 1986).
27. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 60.
28. Id. at 79.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id.
31. Following convention, the term "market," denoting the singular, is used here. But a
credit economy consists of many financial markets. The "inflationary expectations" component
will be uniform in all of those markets.
32. Short-term refers to liabilities whose maturities range from a single day up to one year.
Interest on loans maturing in more than one year are regarded as long-term rates. C. AMMER &
D. AMMER, supra note 25, at 423-24.
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age inflation rate. Inflationary expectations reflected in longer term
rates are more likely to vary from current inflation rates.33
The "real" interest rate is the price required to induce a lender to
effect an exchange between current and future consumption.34  The
"real" interest rate is determined by the supply and demand of funds,
which in turn is affected by time preference, time endowment, and
time productivity.35 Preferences and endowment tend to be stable,
though recessions and booms, reflecting expected changes in produc-
tivity, may temporarily influence the real interest rate.36 The real
interest rate component is estimated to fluctuate between 2% and
4%37
Inflationary expectations and the real rate of interest are the same
for all borrowers. The risk premium accounts for differences in inter-
est rates obtained by individual borrowers in the market.3 Interest
rates on loans considered low-risk are lower than interest rates on
33. Professor Brigham presents the results of a University of Michigan Survey Research
Center study. It reported inflationary expectations of 4% for 1983 and 6% to 7% for the
following five to ten years. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 62 n.6. The Consumer Price Index
(CPI), "All Items," during 1983 increased by 3.8%; very close to the expected rate. PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Table B-59 (1987)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT].
34. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 61; J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRcE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
415 (1976).
35. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 34, at 430-32. The time at which consumption is preferred,
whether currently or in the future, is called time preference. Id. at 431. Preference for current
consumption increases the demand for loans and hence increases interest rates. For example,
differences in the real interest rate between the United States and Japan can be explained by
different attitudes toward saving in the two countries.
Time endowment refers to the relationship of current wealth to expected future wealth. For
example, law students often have little current wealth. They may borrow now expecting greater
wealth in the future. Persons approaching retirement generally expect a decline in wealth. They
tend to save. Aggregating these individual preferences determines the demand for and supply of
loans.
The productivity per time period of assets acquired with borrowed funds presents a limit on
how much borrowers can afford to pay for the loan. Professor Brigham gives the example of
Robinson Crusoe needing a fishing season to develop an improved fishing net that will double the
harvest. He would be willing to return two fish for every one that Friday gives up this season to
feed Crusoe. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 55-56.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 61. The real interest rate component has been estimated by using historical interest
rates on riskless government securities and deducting the inflation rate observed for the same
time periods. Those studies show that the real interest rate component ranges from 2% to 4%
per year. But see R. BREALEY & S. MYaRS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 118 (2d ed.
1984) (citing R. IBBOTSON & R. SINQUEFIELD, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION: THE
,PAST AND THE FUTURE (1982)) (the real rate on Treasury bills averaged only 0.1% from 1926 to
1981).
38. For example, long-term bond rates in December 1986 were at 7.1% for Treasury bonds,
8.5% for Aaa Corporate bonds, and 10.0% for Baa Corporate bonds. ECONOMIC REPORT, supra
1047
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high-risk loans.39 The yield on Treasury securities is one of the lowest
interest rates4° because repayment is guaranteed and Treasury securi-
ties are traded in an active market. The prime rate,41 interest on con-
sumer loans, and many other rates are higher than the rate of return
on Treasury securities.
B. Applying the Market Rate Analysis
Courts using Collier's market rate analysis have found that the mar-
ket produces many interest rates.42 In applying Collier's market rate
analysis they have developed several definitions of the relevant mar-
ket.43  Although courts have not analyzed the interest rate issue by
looking to the elements of interest rates, grouping the various theories
according to these elements provides a framework for later discussion.
note 33, at Table B-68. Corporate borrowers had to pay more than the government, and among
the corporate borrowers, those more creditworthy paid lower rates.
The risk premium is further classified as follows: First, it includes the risk of default, which
means that the borrower does not pay the interest or principal in a timely manner. E. BRIGHAM,
supra note 26, at 62. Second, a liquidation premium reflects risks that result because the debt
instrument cannot be readily converted to cash, usually because the instrument is not actively
traded. Id. at 63. This Comment refers to the combination of these risks when the term "risk
premium" is used.
A third class of risk, the so-called maturity risk premium, involves the different risk premiums
assigned to debt instruments according to the time to maturity. A so-called term structure
results which can be traced to inflationary expectations and the risk that inflation will not be
accurately forecasted. Riskless Treasury securities exhibit a term structure. E. BRIGHAM, supra
note 26, at 63. "Inflationary expectations," as used in this Comment, are assumed to include the
maturity risk premium.
39. Assuming inflationary expectations and the real rate are the same in both.
40. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 62.
41. The prime rate is the lowest loan rate offered by commercial banks to large, well-known
corporate borrowers of the highest credit standing. D. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND MONEY 176-77 (3d ed. 1987).
42. See, e.g., In re Orosco, 77 Bankr. 246, 253 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (rates charged by
various lenders obviously vary); In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76 Bankr. 573, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1987) (court examined interest rates for different time periods, for residential mortgages, and for
Treasury securities); see also E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 48 (expressing the idea differently,
namely that a great many different financial markets exist, each dealing with a different type of
security, serving a different set of customers, or operating in a different part of the country).
43. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. The cases cited there as representative of
the various theories include other than Chapter 11 cram down cases, but the same requirement
exists that the present value of deferred payments must equal the value of the creditor's claim.
Courts have used methods of analysis as precedent for cases under different deferred payment
provisions of the Code. See United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1284 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1986) (because sections require that a creditor be provided with the present value of its
claim, the method of determining the proper interest rate is the same under each section); see also
In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503, 1504 n.1 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Orosco, 77 Bankr. 246, 252-53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Eisenbarth, 77 Bankr.
228, 235 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
1048
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1. Inflationary Expectations
Many courts reason that cram down interest rates should be based
on market rates because market rates reflect current economic condi-
tions.4 Short-term Treasury bill rates are favored by those courts.45
Courts that look to market interest rates to insure that current eco-
nomic conditions are reflected reject rates that were set in the past.46
Because the change in rates over time reflects primarily47 the differ-
ence between past and present expectations of future inflation rates,48
courts that choose current rates are primarily concerned with award-
ing the most current expectations of future inflation rates. That
purpose, however, is not stated, understood, or questioned by most
courts that require interest rates which reflect "current economic
conditions."'49
2. The Real Interest Rate
Many courts begin their analysis with market rates, but conclude
that market rates can be used only with certain adjustments. Some
courts reduce market rates by a "profit" element.5 0 Usually, their
44. See, e.g., In re Connecticut Aerosols, 42 Bankr. 706, 711 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984)
(interest must be set by reference to market conditions); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 373
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (prime-rate based interest on delinquent federal taxes is appropriate
because it is indicative of "then-existing" economic conditions).
45. In re Connecticut Aerosols, 42 Bankr. 706, 711 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Fisher, 29
Bankr. 542, 543 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (short-term Treasury bills reflect changes in our volatile
economy because they are auctioned frequently); In re Tacoma Recycling, 23 Bankr. 547, 550
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (Treasury bill rate is indicative of existing economic conditions). The
interest (discount) rate on Treasury bills is determined weekly at public auction. C. AmMER & D.
AMMER, supra note 25, at 473. They mature within one year. Compared to other rates, short-
term Treasury bill rates are very sensitive to current inflation rates.
46. See, e.g., In re Southern States Motor Inns, 709 F.2d 647, 651-52 (11th Cir. 1983) (rate
proposed by creditor will have been established some months earlier and often will differ from
actual market rates), cert. detied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
47. See supra text accompanying note 36.
48. For example, the rate of return on ten-year Treasury notes dropped from 9.2% in January
1986 to 7.1% in December 1986. Inflation, as measured by the CPI, averaged 3.8% in 1985, but
dropped to 1.1% during 1986. ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 33, at Tables B-59 and B-68.
The experience of lower inflation rates during 1986 led to lower expected inflation rates for the
future. All interest rates reflected this change in expectations with a gradual decline during 1986.
Id. at Table B-68. But two years later, expectations of higher rates held in early 1986 appear
more accurate than those held in late 1986. As of June 1, 1988, the inflation rate is at 4.8% and
ten-year Treasury notes yield 7.5% per year.
49. See infra note 67.
50. In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 546 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (appropriate interest rate is what
a creditor would charge a nonchapter 13 debtor if a profit is removed).
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decisions simply assert without explanation that profit is an inappro-
priate element of cram down interest rates.51
The courts which seek to eliminate the profit element do not clearly
articulate what is meant by "profit." The real interest component is
the profit element of the market rate. 2 Courts that reduce market
rates by the "profit" element are indirectly denying the creditor com-
pensation for the coerced taking of the creditor's current use of
funds.5
3
3. The Risk Premium
Courts which are primarily concerned with determining the appro-
priate risk premium begin by citing Collier's method of determining
the appropriate interest rate. Collier states that the appropriate rate is
the market rate that the creditor would charge on a loan "to a third
party with similar terms, duration, collateral, and risk."54
51. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 7 Bankr. 537, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (discount rate should
not generate a profit for creditor).
52. Profit is usually defined as revenue less costs. In the lending industry, revenue is equal to
the total interest income. Costs include losses from default and declining purchasing power. D.
PEARCE, supra note 22, at 357. A specific loan transaction, applying that equation, may yield a
"profit" because the risks of default or inflation were overestimated. Assuming an efficient
market, such "profit" cannot be realized from the aggregate of loan transactions. In the
aggregate, profit will be reduced to the premium charged by lenders for giving up the productive
use of funds, the real interest component.
53. If payment was guaranteed and inflationary expectations were zero, deferred payments
without interest would be equivalent to immediate payment under this theory. The theory
overlooks the productive capacity of capital over time.
54. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.03, at 1129-62 (L. King 15th ed. 1979) (emphasis
added). Courts have applied this definition of the appropriate market interest rate with varying
emphases. Some focus on the characteristics of the deferred payments and require market rates
on loans that involve the same duration, amortization rate, and type of collateral. The
creditworthiness of the debtor and the usual lending practices of the creditor are generally
ignored. See, e.g., In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 658 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980)
(court set rate at the "high end of the range for a typical garden apartment loan").
In other courts, the debtor's characteristics receive the greatest attention. In a Ninth Circuit
decision, In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987),
the court rephrased Collier's definition by holding that the debtor must pay the interest rate it
would pay a commercial lender (the creditor in this case was the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS")) for a loan involving an equivalent amount, duration, default risk, and collateral. Id. at
1504. Rejecting the IRS's argument that it should receive the same interest that it charges on
delinquent taxes, the court stated that the debtor's characteristics determined the interest rate
and that the creditor's characteristics were irrelevant. Id. at 1506. In this consolidated case, the
appeals court also reversed two of the lower court's decisions which had set the interest rate
based on Treasury securities yields. The court reasoned that the debtors could not obtain credit
on the same favorable terms available to the government. Id.; accord In re Orosco, 77 Bankr.
246, 252-53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); see also In re Hildreth, 43 Bankr. 721, 723 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1984) (certain interest rates provide "debtors with financing at rates they could not have
received otherwise and fail[ ] to compensate secured creditors for risks which they are forced to
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Except for duration, all the factors to be compared relate to the
riskiness of the loan.55 The rate a particular creditor charges, beyond
market-wide inflationary expectations and the real rate of interest
charged by all lenders, is determined by that creditor's particular atti-
tude to risk.56 The terms and collateral underlying the loan also affect
only the risk component." In addition, Collier's formula expressly
requires that the loan be of the same risk as the deferred payment
arrangement. 8
III. THE LIMITS OF MARKET RATE ANALYSIS
Widespread acceptance of market rate analysis has shaped the
nature of litigation over deferred payments. Court opinions involving
these provisions frequently read like discourses in economics or corpo-
rate finance. 9 They give the appearance of scientific accuracy. How-
ever, errors in understanding or explaining loan markets and interest
take"); In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 262 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (rate of interest must reflect
viability of debtor).
A third interpretation views the coerced loan from the creditor's perspective. Two variants
have developed. Under the first interpretation of Collier's definition, the interest rate must be
equal to the rates charged by the creditor to other borrowers of similar loans. This definition sets
aside the debtor's creditworthiness and focuses on the lender's normal lending practices. In re
Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1340 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (contract rate was the only one in the
record that was correlated with the "cost" to the creditor of the deferred payment plan); In re
Eisenbarth, 77 Bankr. 228, 235 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (court rejected rate proposed by debtor
because it was not the rate that the secured creditor charged its loan customers). The second
creditor-oriented method of determining the interest rate uses the cost to the creditor of replacing
the amount of the claim until paid by the debtor. The interest rate therefore reflects the
creditor's creditworthiness as a borrower. In re Hardzog, 74 Bankr. 701, 704 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1987) (the interest rate should reflect the actual rate the creditor must pay to obtain the
replacement funds).
55. Comparing the duration of the deferred payment schedule with the term of the market
loan picks up inflationary expectations for that time period.
56. The proposition does not imply that lenders are free to set interest rates. Rather, they are
free to choose the level of risk they want to take by entering the appropriate loan market. E.
BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 57. See, eg., In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 267 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1984) (citing . WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 242-43 (5th ed. 1975))
(investment in higher yielding instruments implies willingness to take greater risk).
57. D. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 41, at 180-81 (banks, in assigning a default risk
premium to a customer, consider the borrower's character, cash flow, wealth, and collateral).
58. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 1129.03, at 1129-62 (L. King 15th ed. 1979). Collier does
not mention the debtor in the formula. Instead, the loan is to a "third party." At the same time,
the formula requires equal risk. This necessarily entails consideration of the debtor's
creditworthiness. In fact, many courts that base their analysis on Collier emphasize the debtor's
creditworthiness.
59. See, eg., In re Arnold, 80 Bankr. 806, 809 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) (explaining that
aspects of risk are not limited to default, but include liquidity risk and inflationary expectations).
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rates are common.6° Theories are misapplied in factually different con-
texts.6" Unguided judgments about the proper risk premium are often
presented as the inevitable result of market rate analysis.
A better treatment of the interest rate issue is achieved by referring
to the purposes of business reorganization law. Market rates have lim-
ited usefulness, supplying only the inflationary expectation component
and the real interest rate component of an appropriate interest rate.
The proper risk premium has to be chosen by the court because a mar-
ket for this type of loan does not exist. To make the choice, courts
should define the relative rights of debtors and creditors. Doing so
will give debtors and creditors better information on which to base
their decisions when faced with a Chapter 11 proceeding. As a result,
negotiated settlements will be more likely and litigation more efficient.
Market interest rates are relevant in determining the present value
of a claim. Courts must recognize the limits of the market rate
approach, however. Its limits are best understood by examining each
component of the interest rate separately. This method of analysis
shows that market rates provide a useful measure of inflationary
expectations and of the real interest rate, but are useless in determin-
ing an appropriate risk premium.
A. Inflationary Expectations
Many courts hold that market rates are appropriate because they
are "current." The only current economic conditions reflected in mar-
ket interest rates are inflationary expectations. Courts which use this
standard imply that the creditor must be compensated for the
expected loss of purchasing power.62 Neither the statute nor the legis-
lative history expressly refers to compensation for loss of purchasing
power. But the terms "present value" and "time-value" of money
appear frequently. These are terms of art63 which should derive their
60. See, e.g., In re Bay Area Servs., 26 Bankr. 811, 814 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (court
ordered interest rate calculated by adding 10% for inflation to the prime rate). Because the
prime rate already includes inflationary expectations, the creditor was compensated twice for the
loss of purchasing power.
61. Compare In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 266 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (court reasoned
that taxing authority was not entitled to a profit and transaction cost because it was not a
commercial lender) with In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 657, 661 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) and In re
Lum, I Bankr. 186, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("profit" was also disallowed although
creditors were commercial lenders).
62. These courts usually do not discuss the goal of compensating the creditor for the loss of
purchasing power. But see In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 262 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (court
considered whether inflation rate would be sufficient interest rate and concluded that creditors at
a minimum should be compensated for the loss of purchasing power).
63. Id. at 261 (present value is a term of art used by the economic and financial communities).
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meaning from the art that uses them:' economics and corporate
finance. These disciplines consider inflationary expectations an impor-
tant component of interest rates.6" Courts could conclude that interest
on deferred payments has to include the right measure of inflationary
expectations66 and that market rates reflect that measure.
Many courts that insist on current rates, however, ignore the time
period over which the deferred payments are to be made under the
plan.67 If loss of purchasing power is to be gauged accurately, the
market interest rates should match the deferred payment schedule
with respect to time to maturity. Superficial applications of the mar-
ket rate approach have led courts to use the wrong market rate. These
courts apparently do not understand what role interest rates play in
compensating creditors for giving up the current use of funds. They
postulate that- interest rates have'to reflect "current economic condi-
tions," without understanding the requirement and without explaining
how the Code or policy considerations justify it.
B. The Real Interest Rate
The market rate 'approach has led to other superficial analyses.
Courts have concluded that interest rates should not include a "profit"
element. The meaning of that assertion is unclear.6 9 Courts may be
referring to the real interest rate, any excess of the market rate over
the contract interest rate, or to a double charge by the creditor for the
risk of default.70
64. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *59.
65. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 61 (inflation has a major impact on interest rates).
66. Inflation rates were relatively high when the Code was being considered by both Houses
and when it finally was passed. In the five-year period 1969 through 1973, inflation averaged 5%
per year. During the five-year period immediately preceding passage of the Code, 1974 through
1978, inflation averaged 8% per year. ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 33, at Table B-59 (rates
calculated from data presented in Table B-59). At that time, the most obvious difference between
the present and future value of a claim was the intervening loss of purchasing power.
67. See, eg., In re Connecticut Aerosols, 42 Bankr. 706 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (tax claim to
be paid over six years, but court set rate based on average accepted auction price for the last
auction of 52-week Treasury bills).
68. For example, three-month Treasury ,bills yielded 5.5% per year interest in December
1986 while ten-year Treasury notes yielded 7.1%. ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 33, at Table
B-68. Higher than current inflation rates were expected over the next ten years. If payments
under a plan are due ten years from now, the ten-year rate is appropriate. To take advantage of
the information that market rates provide, the maturity dates of the market debt instruments
must match the payment dates under the plan.
69. Cf In re Arnold, 80 Bankr. 806, 809 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) (criticizing statement in a
law review article that interest rate on government securities does not include a profit element,
and is therefore appropriate in cram down, as a "bold, and bald," assumption).
70. The two latter interpretations only apply when the case involves a pre-petition loan
agreement.
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The interest rate on deferred payments should include a real interest
component. Choices or opportunities offered by current availability of
money have inherent value. To induce the holder of money to give up
that value, a price has to be paid. The real interest rate is established
as the market price at which individuals are willing to exchange cur-
rent for future choices or opportunities offered by holding money.7
Since most courts agree that deferred payments require some interest
payment to compensate the creditor for the loss of use of funds, the
appropriate rate should include the real interest component.
Courts sometimes speak of prohibiting a "profit" element in the
interest rate to prevent creditors from profiting as a direct result of the
debtor's Chapter 11 proceeding. The creditor could "profit" if the rate
used at plan confirmation is higher than the contract rate of a pre-
petition loan agreement.72 Had the debtor fulfilled the contract, the
creditor would have received a lower interest rate.
A court facing this situation should begin by articulating the prob-
lem. Articulating the problem will prevent improper application of
the rationale to claims not involving pre-petition contracts, such as tax
claims. The next step is to acknowledge competing creditor and
debtor positions on the relevance of the contract interest rate.73 The
court may, for example, decide in a particular case that the higher
market rate would prevent the debtor's reorganization. If policy con-
siderations underlying the Code indicate that the debtor should reor-
ganize, the court can conclude that the contract rate represents a
ceiling for interest on deferred payments.
Pre-petition contract interest rates include a default risk premium.
One of the risks the lender anticipated and insured against is that the
borrower may seek protection under Chapter 11. According to this
71. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
72. If the reorganization plan maintains other features of the loan agreement, such as
duration and amortization, the creditor can reap a windfall from the reorganization that provides
for deferred payments at market interest rates. The reverse is also true. The debtor "profits"
when market rates are lower than the contract rate. See, e.g., In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co.,
36 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (court required contract rate on twenty-month-old loan to
avoid giving windfall to debtor).
73. For example, the creditor that wants the higher market rate will insist that the contract
rate was based on the assumption that it could foreclose on the collateral in case of default. Had
the creditor been allowed to foreclose, it could have invested the foreclosure proceeds at the
higher market rate. According to this argument, the creditor is not receiving an extraordinary
profit; the court is only protecting the creditor's rights under state law if it awarded market rates.
Proponents of the contract rate as a ceiling can point out that the bargain may have included
foreclosure rights, but any loan is foremost a contract where the creditor expects to receive the
bargained-for interest rate. If the debtor's plan proposes to repay the creditor according to the
terms of the loan agreement, the creditor still receives what it bargained for.
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interpretation of the "no profit" rationale, the creditor now can be
treated less favorably than a lender in the market making an original
loan because it was already compensated for the risk that has
materialized.
This rationale is both appealing and far reaching. Taken to the
extreme, it would support the argument that the creditor anticipated
losing its entire claim in Chapter 11, charged an appropriate risk pre-
mium under the contract, and therefore should lose the entire claim.
If courts took such a position, market rates would skyrocket and
destroy an efficient credit economy. Thus, it could not be reconciled
with the purposes of the bankruptcy system. But a carefully chosen
position, one which recognizes that market rates reflect risks however
defined by the legal system, will insure that the bankruptcy system
supports efficient financial markets. That position would require
choosing an interest rate low enough to promote successful reorgani-
zation, but not so low as to raise market rates to such an extent that
the loan markets contract.
C. The Risk Premium
Allowing the debtor to pay claims over time involves some risk that
the debtor will never make the deferred payments.74 Market rate anal-
ysis cannot tell courts who should bear that risk in a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding. Courts have developed several theories in a futile effort to fix
the proper risk premium. Each defines the relevant market-equivalent
transaction differently and ignores the basic fact that the issue of the
proper risk premium arises in a Chapter 11 proceeding.75
These different theories can be criticized in two ways. First, these
theories focus the litigants' arguments on market transactions, while
courts base their decisions on interpretations of the debtors' and credi-
tors' rights in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Second, despite the existence
of so many different theories, courts have not acknowledged that mar-
ket rate analysis leaves much room for discretion in determining the
proper risk premium.
Market rates only provide an accurate measure of inflationary
expectations and the real interest component. They do not determine
74. Some courts hold that the risk of nonpayment is minimal because the confirmed plan
must be feasible. E.g., In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 544-45 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). Other courts
cite the high failure rate of confirmed plans as an indication of the debtor's riskiness. E.g., In re
Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 266 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). In United States v. Neal Pharmacal
Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1288 (8th Cir. 1986), the court found that reorganized debtors are at least as
likely to default as nonreorganizing corporate debtors.
75. See supra note 54.
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the risk premium appropriate in Chapter 11. Courts, by ignoring this
fact, have become involved in fruitless debate and a waste of judicial
resources. Many courts, for example, state that the appropriate risk
premium should consist of the market's assessment of the risk
involved in lending to one with the particular debtor's characteristics.
Some creditors have taken this requirement literally, insisting that
deferred payments, regardless of the proposed interest rate, would
never be adequate compensation for giving up a present claim to the
collateral.76 Debtors have claimed that this would set the interest rate
so high that reorganization would be impossible." Thus, by interpret-
ing the courts' theory literally, both debtor and creditor can claim that
the market-equivalent transaction would not take place."
The real argument between debtor and creditor is not about eco-
nomic theory and loan markets but about their rights. Creditors either
believe the debtor should liquidate or that they are entitled to a greater
share of the debtor's future income. Debtors believe that a higher
interest rate will give the creditor more than the value of its claim, to
76. E.g., In re Orosco, 77 Bankr. 246, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (secured creditor argued
that debtor was not a qualified borrower under its lending practices because of the debtor's
default record.); In re wolf, 61 Bankr. 1010, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (creditors offered
bank officials' testimony that no loans at 100% of value would be made); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17
Bankr. 367, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (payment over time not equivalent to immediate
payment because taxes on payments are due immediately). In Nite Lite Inns, the creditor also
argued that it should be able to sell the debtor's note and receive the value of its claim although
the note would be discounted by 40%-50%. Id. at 373; In re Landmark at Plaza Park Ltd., 7
Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (regardless of the interest rate offered, the value of the
payment stream will be less than the value of the property that secures the claim because an
investor would prefer the property to debtor's promise to pay).
77. In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (if rate has to be based on
hypothetical transaction by a distressed small business, debtor could not obtain financing at any
price).
78. The creditor-oriented interpretation of Collier's definition of the appropriate interest rate
has been similarly attacked. In response to the court's requirement that the interest rate equal
the rate charged by the creditor on similar loans, creditors have argued that they do not make
similar loans. They simply do not lend to borrowers that are bad credit risks. In re 360 Inns,
Ltd., 76 Bankr. 573, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (creditor offered testimony that it would not
make loans of the kind proposed under the plan). Banks rate each customer's credit risk and
demand higher rates as risk of default increases. At some point, banks refuse credit. D.
KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 41, at 180-82.
Courts have also rejected the theory, reasoning that interest rates would depend on the
creditor's willingness to take risks. Different rates would be required for different creditors under
the same plan. In re Arnold, 80 Bankr. 806, 811 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987); In re Benford, 14
Bankr. 157, 160 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
The replacement cost theory has been criticized as well. Creditors point out that their good
credit ratings allow them to borrow at lower rates, but they still have to look to the debtor to pay
off the replacement loan. Under this theory, creditors clearly bear the risk of nonpayment. In re
Hardzog, 74 Bankr. 701, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987).
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the detriment of other creditors and equity holders, and that it will
threaten a successful reorganization.
These arguments, rather than expert testimony on market interest
rates, need to be developed by the parties and then dealt with directly
by the court.79 A creditor could argue, for example, that the debtor's
plan is barely feasible. If the plan can be confirmed at all, the creditor
should be solidly protected. In setting the risk premium, the court
could agree with the creditor and find that only a very high interest
rate will make the value of the deferred payments equal to the value of
the creditor's claim. The court's own estimate, in light of the purposes
to be served by reorganization law, is more relevant than market risk
premiums.80
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PURPOSE-ORIENTED ANALYSIS
Any direct analysis of the interest rate issue needs to incorporate
systematically the purposes of reorganization law. The courts must
answer two questions: First, whether the interest rate should be uni-
form8 1 or case-specific82 in all cram down cases, and second, whether
79. Most courts are fully aware that creditors and debtors are fighting over assets and income
and not over appropriate market interest rates. Many courts in fact weigh the interests of
creditors and debtor, and then decide on an "equitable" interest rate. See, eg., In re 360 Inns,
Ltd., 76 Bankr. 573, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (because debtor was solvent and intended to
let equity holders participate, proposed rate was too low); In re Wolf, 61 Bankr. 1010, 1012
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (court found that "[o]n balance, I conclude that an interest rate of I%
is appropriate and will accord the objecting creditors fair and equitable treatment within the
meaning and spirit of [the cram down provisions.]") Unfortunately, the courts do not articulate
the factors and weight of the interests to be balanced, leaving creditors and debtors without
guidance. Cf. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 74 (bankruptcy system should supply
information to guide conduct of participants in the credit economy).
80. If the court finds that the need to protect the creditor outweighs the interests of unsecured
creditors and the debtor in a successful reorganization, it can reject all rates as too low, giving the
secured creditor additional bargaining power. If such a high rate ends up making reorganization
infeasible, it means that the cram down provisions have functioned properly to protect the
creditor.
81. In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 272 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (announcing intent to use
the rate on delinquent federal taxes with a 2.5% adjustment in all cases unless special
circumstances require different adjustment); In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 552 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1983) (court will use 52-week Treasury bill rate plus 1% risk factor in all pending and future
Chapter 13 cases); cf In re Loveridge Machine & Tool Co., 36 Bankr. 159, 168 (Bankr. D. Utah
1983) (Chapter 13 cases tend to deal with the interest rate en masse, while Chapter 11 has the fair
and equitable requirement).
82. K-g., In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986) (despite
savings of money and time achieved by a uniform rate, "language of section 1129(a)(9)(C) ...
clearly compels... determination... on a case by case basis"); In re Southern States Motor
Inns, 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting bankruptcy court's decision to use the same rate in
all cases), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
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the rate should be relatively high or low. 3 Examining the benefits and
drawbacks of each choice will insure systematic analysis of debtor and
creditor rights in Chapter 11, of the proceedings' efficiency, and of the
strategic responses that can be expected of debtors and creditors. Ulti-
mately, a court must balance these considerations to determine the
appropriate interest rate.84
A. Uniform or Case-Specific Interest Rates
Using either a uniform or case-specific interest rate represents a fun-
damental judgment about the relative rights of creditors and debtors.
A uniform rate would turn the "fair and equitable" requirement of
cram down into a threshold test. Regardless of the circumstances, a
plan would have to include a specific pre-determined interest rate.
Thus, a uniform rate would in effect amount to a pre-determination
that the deferred payments have a present value equal to the value of
the claim.
Knowing in advance which interest rate will pass the cram down
test would make cram down proceedings more efficient. With a uni-
form rate, debtors and creditors could more easily assess whether reor-
ganization is an option or whether the debtor should liquidate.8 5
Because the parties would know what interest rate the plan must
include, a uniform rate also would save hearings and expensive expert
testimony on the interest rate question. Finally, it would insure that
issues already decided by the court, such as the good faith of the
debtor or feasibility of the plan, would not be reargued indirectly over
the interest rate issue.8 6
A uniform rate, however, would preclude a case-by-case determina-
tion of the appropriate rate. A plan extremely likely to succeed would
have to propose the same interest rate as one that is barely feasible. A
83. A riskless rate is a low interest rate. All interest rates that include a risk premium are
treated here as relatively high rates.
84. The following discussion assumes that the court uses a riskless market rate such as
Treasury securities of the appropriate maturity as a base rate. It has concluded that the
creditor's purchasing power has to be protected and that the creditor has to be compensated for
giving up the use of funds. The court now examines whether it should add the same or a different
risk premium in each Chapter 11 case, and whether that premium, either fixed or flexible, should
be relatively high or low.
85. In re Fi-Hi Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 271 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (using the interest rate
applicable to delinquent federal taxes, investors can have relative certainty in working toward
reorganization).
86. E.g., In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1985) (contentions that the plan
is too risky must be addressed in terms of the cram down standards or the feasibility
requirement). But see In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 656 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1980) (court recognized that interest rate would impact feasibility).
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creditor likely to benefit from the reorganization would receive the
same interest rate as one likely only to be hurt by delay. Debtors
could use Chapter 11 to obtain lower interest rates on their loans or
they may have to pay higher than contract rates. The interest rate
would be the same whether or not unsecured claims of employees and
trade creditors could be paid.
Conversely, a case-specific rate would allow the court to take into
account the differences among Chapter 11 cases. Cram down requires
a fair and equitable plan. Equality of the value of deferred payments
and the claim represents one aspect of a plan's fairness and equity.
Because a court has to judge what level of interest insures such equal-
ity, it could extend the "fair and equitable" test to that judgment. A
court could, therefore, require a lower rate when the plan is solid and
likely to succeed. A higher rate would be appropriate when the debtor
was suspected of questionable objectives such as refinancing at lower
market rates or stalling inevitable liquidation.
The efficiency of predictable interest rates lost by this approach,
however, far exceeds the gain in fairness.8 7 Efficient cram down pro-
ceedings will also result in more efficient loan markets. 8 The loan
market passes the costs currently associated with the inefficiencies and
uncertainties of cram down proceedings on to the borrower in the
form of higher interest rates. Other things being equal, uniform rates
reflecting increased certainty over creditor and debtor rights in cram
down will result in lower rates.
Fairness also prevails with predictable rates. Application of a uni-
form rate serves as notice to borrowers and lenders 9 of their respec-
tive rights, should the debtor file for protection under Chapter 11.
The predictable cram down rate will be reflected in the contract rate.
A fair result is achieved when the court fulfills the parties'
expectations.
B. High or Low Interest Rates
If courts are willing to take into account the market response, the
problem of the appropriate risk premium can be easily solved. The
87. Cf COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 82 (although bankruptcy has long been
regarded as an equity and not a legal process, the amount of decision-making should be
minimized to save costs).
88. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 26, at 49 (economy depends on efficient financial markets;
employment, productivity, and standard of living would be lower if financial markets were not
efficient).
89. Judgment lien creditors and holders of tax claims who do not negotiate contract interest
rates cannot benefit from this notice.
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market will adjust to any consistent risk premium chosen by the
courts. Courts only need to consider whether relatively high or low
rates further Chapter 1 l's purposes of encouraging fair, negotiated
reorganization plans that give debtors a chance to survive while pro-
tecting the interests of creditors.
The riskless interest rate, a relatively low rate, would best advance
these objectives. The creditor still receives protection from the loss of
purchasing power and also receives a real rate of interest. Requiring
creditors to forego the risk premium involves only a minor loss of
rights. Creditors would recoup the loss by charging higher interest
rates in general, but market interest rates will not increase so signifi-
cantly as to impair the loan market. Lower interest rates will also
make more reorganization plans feasible and successful.
A uniform, low cram down interest rate would affect the relative
bargaining power of creditor and debtor in plan negotiations. Most
likely, debtors would offer exactly the pre-determined interest rate.
Creditors cannot threaten to reject the plan with the hope that the
court will require a higher rate in cram down. Although the interest
on deferred payments would be fixed, debtor and creditor could still
negotiate the value of the claim.9" Known interest rates would narrow
the areas of possible dispute sufficiently to make negotiated settlements
more likely. Keeping negotiations focused on fewer issues is more
likely to lead to confirmed plans without expensive resort to cram
down.
Using uniform, riskless interest rates in cram down of secured credi-
tors will also provide the balance of bargaining power that is now lack-
ing. A secured creditor is usually the sole member of the class and,
therefore, has veto power over any proposed plan. The more uncer-
tain the outcome and the higher the expense of cram down, the greater
the risk that the power will be exercised. Case-by-case analysis, which
often concludes that the debtor has to pay higher than proposed inter-
est rates, gives secured creditors too much power.
V. CONCLUSION
Using Treasury securities yields of the appropriate maturity as cram
down interest rates in all cases would be both efficient and fair for
several reasons. First, these riskless, relatively low rates would
increase the chance of successful reorganization, benefitting unsecured
creditors and equity holders. Second, creditors would be compensated
90. Axe, supra note 17, at 448 (question of valuation is resolved through negotiations in light
of uncertain court decisions).
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for the loss of purchasing power and for the loss of use of funds.
Many creditors could achieve additional protection by adjusting con-
tract interest rates according to this clear cram down rule. Third, a
clear standard would promote negotiated agreements between debtor
and creditor. Certainty of outcome if the dispute is litigated would
eliminate the dispute in most cases. The threat of the secured creditor
forcing cram down would be less powerful because the litigation
would be less expensive. This improved balance of bargaining power
between debtor and creditor also would encourage negotiated
settlement.
A case-specific market interest rate that reflects the characteristics
of the debtor, the creditor, or the loan is a costly requirement in Chap-
ter 11 cram down. Costs are not limited to the expense of expert testi-
mony to establish market interest rates. They also include the cost of
increased litigation and loss of private control over outcomes as a
result of unpredictable court decisions. On balance, a uniform, pre-
dictable interest rate better serves the purposes of the bankruptcy
system.
Waltraud S. Scott
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